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ABSTRACT: Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which
it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well
received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless,
in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive
evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Ander-
sen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical
thinking, dynamic frames, and the like to illuminate and develop various aspects of Kuhn’s
thought in Structure. In particular this work aims to give depth to the Kuhnian concepts
of a paradigm and incommensurability. I review this work and identify two broad strands
of research. One emphasizes work on concepts; the other focusses on cognitive habits. Con-
trasting these, I argue that the conceptual strand fails to be a complete account of scientific
revolutions. We need a broad approach that draws on a variety of resources in psychology
and cognitive science.
Keywords: Kuhn; cognitive science; incommensurability; analogy; naturalism.
RESUMEN: La estructura de las revoluciones científicas de Kuhn es destacable por la facilidad con
que aprovecha los resultados de la psicología cognitiva. Estos elementos naturalistas no tu-
vieron una buena acogida y Kuhn no los desarrolló posteriormente en su trabajo publicado.
No obstante, desde un ambiente filosófico más receptivo hacia el naturalismo podemos ofre-
cer una evaluación más positiva de las propuestas de Kuhn. Recientemente, algunos filósofos
como Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker y Chen han utilizado los resultados del trabajo
sobre el razonamiento basado en casos, el pensamiento analógico, los marcos dinámicos,
etc., para iluminar y desarrollar varios aspectos del pensamiento de Kuhn en La estructura.
En particular, este trabajo intenta dar profundidad a los conceptos kuhnianos de paradigma
e inconmensurabilidad. En este artículo examino dicho trabajo e identifico dos principales
corrientes de investigación. Una de ellas subraya el trabajo sobre conceptos y la otra se
centra en los hábitos cognitivos. Después de contrastar ambas, sostengo que la corriente
conceptual no logra ser una explicación completa de las revoluciones científicas. Necesita-
mos una perspectiva amplia que aproveche una variedad de recursos de la psicología y la
ciencia cognitiva.
Palabras clave: Kuhn; ciencia cognitiva; inconmensurabilidad; analogía; naturalismo.
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1. Introduction
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a work intended to have
philosophical significance but which draws most of its resources from history of
science. Structure has had enormous influence in both philosophy and history
or science. It has also had a great deal of influence in the sociology of science
(and social theory more widely). Perhaps surprisingly, for all that Kuhn’s ideas
were adopted and developed in sociology, Kuhn’s own appeals to works in
sociology in Structure are few. Rather more numerous are Kuhn’s references
to works in psychology. Kuhn’s interest in psychology was largely ignored in
the decades following the publication of Structure. The one exception to the
latter concerns Kuhn’s remarks drawing on Gestalt psychology, which received
a hostile reception from philosophers, with little real attempt to understand
what Kuhn was seeking to do with those ideas.
One reason why his philosophical contemporaries dismissed Kuhn’s appeal
to Gestalt psychology and ignored his discussion of experimental results in
cognitive psychology, for example those stemming from the work of Kuhn’s
Harvard colleagues, Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman, is that such references
to the results of empirical science in supporting an argument with philosophical
conclusions were unfamiliar in philosophy. While this kind of naturalism is now
part of the philosophical landscape, it went against the purely aprioristic grain
of philosophy in the 1960s.1
However, now we are indeed open to naturalistic approaches, with the work
of the sciences playing a part in the construction and assessment of philosophi-
cal theses, we should revisit Kuhn’s interest in cognitive psychology. We should
ask how his theories may be developed and evaluated in the light of research
in psychology and cognitive science that has been carried out since the pub-
lication of Structure. In this paper I report on two broad ways in which such
work has been deployed to develop Kuhnian themes. The first starts with the
exemplar idea and argues that training with exemplars can inculcate certain
cognitive habits, which may be used to explain the functioning of paradigms
in normal science as well as the phenomenon of of incommensurability in rev-
olutionary science. This approach takes its cue primarily from Kuhn’s work in
Structure. The second draws upon work on concepts in cognitive science; the
most advanced work here is that by Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xi-
ang Chen, drawing upon the work of Lawrence Barsalou on dynamic frames.
Because the second approach is focussed on concepts, and because Kuhn’s
interest in issues of meaning grew after the publication of Structure, that ap-
proach draws to a greater extent on Kuhn’s later writings. My own view is
1 Mention of examples from psychology was not itself unprecedented. Hanson’s Patterns
of Discovery (1958) also does this. But Hanson’s illustrative use of psychological cases
is different from Kuhn’s evidential use. Furthermore, in Kuhn’s hands those examples
added to the (mistaken) impression that he was promoting an irrationalist picture of
science, whereas there was no perception of such an agenda in Hanson’s work.
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that the first approach is potentially the more fruitful. I shall argue that the
second approach is rather less comprehensive than it claims in its ability ei-
ther to articulate Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions or to understand the
revolutions themselves.
2. Exemplars
I share Kuhn’s view that the idea of an exemplar is the most novel aspect of
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970, 187). He said that it was also the
least well understood, and matters in this regard are a little better now than
forty years ago, but not much. The preceding logical empiricist view of scientific
cognition is that the process of generating new ideas in science is a matter of
creativity and is to be understood by psychology if it can be understood at all;
this is the context of discovery. Entirely separate is the context of justification
whereby an idea, say a new hypothesis, is evaluated against the evidence.
This is the epistemic cornerstone of the scientific method. The relationship
is supposed to be an apriori one, and it is the task of philosophers to clarify
its details. A good example of this kind of approach is Hempel’s deductive-
nomological account of confirmation: a hypothesis h is confirmed by evidence
e in the light of background knowledge of relevant conditions c if and only if
e is deducible from h∧c.
Kuhn’s proposal is radically different. First, the relevant unit of assessment
is not the hypothesis but is the puzzle-solution. Secondly, the logical empiricists
held that the hypothesis is evaluated against (total relevant) evidence, whereas
Kuhn holds that the evaluation of a proposed puzzle-solution concerns the
relevant evidence, the puzzle itself, and the puzzle-solving tradition from which
it comes. Thirdly, whereas the logical empiricists held the evaluation relation to
be a logical and apriori one, Kuhn does not think that evaluation of a proposed
puzzle-solution is apriori. Indeed, the relationship between puzzle and proposed
solution may differ from field to field. How do we assess whether the relationship
is a good one? The principal cognitive process involves perceiving similarities
between, on the one hand, the package of puzzle-plus-proposed-solution, and,
on the other hand, an exemplary package of past-puzzle-plus-its-solution. The
exemplary puzzle solution is the paradigm in the narrow sense: a past success
held up by the scientific community as a model of how science is done in this
field. There are of course questions to be asked about why this exemplary
puzzle solution should have that status, to which Kuhn has some answers. But
for current purposes, we need to note that what justifies a proposed puzzle
solution in the eyes of the community is the perceived similarity between that
new puzzle solution and the existing paradigm. Perceiving similarity here is
akin to the process of cognition involved in seeing that John looks like his sister
Jane, or the ability of a connoisseur to recognize the painter of a painting she
has not seen before. These are genuine acts of cognition, but they are not to
be understood along the aprioristic lines of the logical empiricists. Here is how
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Kuhn (1970, 189) sees this at work in learning science:
[Students] regularly report that they have read through a chapter of their text,
understood it perfectly, but nonetheless had difficulty solving a number of the prob-
lems at the chapter’s end. Ordinarily, also, those difficulties dissolve in the same
way. The student discovers, with or without the assistance of his instructor, a way
to see his problem as like a problem he has already encountered. Having seen the
resemblance, grasped the analogy between two or more distinct problems, he can
interrelate symbols and attach them to nature in the ways that have proved effective
before.
Connoisseurship in art provides an instructive illustration of the cognitive
processes involved in scientific puzzle-solving. The art dealer and historian
Bendor Grosvenor (2011) explains,
The ability to tell almost instinctively who painted a picture is defined . . . as con-
noisseurship. The word is derived from the Latin cognoscere, to get to know. The
theory is that the repeated study of an artist’s work allows one to become so familiar
with his or her style and technique that they can be easily recognized, just as we
may recognize the author of a letter not from the signature at the end, but from the
handwriting at the beginning.
The key here is repeated study. It is by exposure to the works of an artist
and their study that one can recognize other works by the same artist. The
resulting ability is almost instinctive, by which I take it that Grosvenor means
that the knowledge is not mediated by a lengthy process of ratiocination. One
can know without having a full appreciation of exactly on what basis one knows.
Interestingly, Grosvenor does not think that immediate instinctive response is
quite right either:
In 1939 the noted art historian Max Friedlander wrote,“The way in which an intuitive
verdict is reached can, from the nature of things, only be described inadequately.
A picture is shown to me. I glance at it, and declare it to be a work by Memling,
without having proceeded to an examination of its full complexity of artistic form.”
Unsurprisingly, only about half of Friedlander’s attributions have stood the test of
time.
Grosvenor thinks that connoisseurship can be supplemented by science, in
which case it cannot be an unreflective response. Furthermore, we should note
the contrast between Grosvenor’s emphasis on study and ‘close looking’ and
Friedlander’s ‘glance’. Intuition comes about as a result of a deep acquaintance
with the exemplar-paintings and careful study of the puzzle-painting. The suc-
cessful connoisseur will look carefully at the brush-work, the pigments used,
the structure of the composition and so forth before coming to a judgment. So
while the judgment is almost instinctive, it is different from instinct or intu-
ition in two respects: (i) it is the product of a learned ability, the outcome of
prolonged study, and (ii) the judgment may well comes about after reflection,
and will be better when it does so.
I suggest that connoisseurship exemplifies the very same kinds of cognitive
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process as Kuhn sees in science. In science the reflective process may be more
involved, but ultimately the nature of the judgment is the same, that the target
(painting, puzzle-solution) resembles the exemplars. It can be seen again in
Kuhn’s parallel with crossword puzzles. Sometimes an experienced solver of
such puzzles will immediately see a solution on reading the clue, but often the
process will require some thought before an answer reveals itself. That it is
the correct answer will not be a matter of a logical relation between it and
the clue and puzzle (though spotting certain logical relations may be part of
the reflective process) and the correctness of the answer will not be readily
apparent to someone who lacks experience with such puzzles.
Since this is so far from the traditional epistemology of science and its search
for logical relations of confirmation, it is perhaps little surprise that, in Kuhn’s
view, it is the main source for the controversies and misunderstanding evoked
by Structure, and in particular the criticism that he is portraying science as a
subjective and irrational enterprise (1970, 175). Nonetheless, says Kuhn, the
tacit knowledge embedded in exemplars, ‘though [it is not], without essential
change, subject to paraphrase in terms of rules and criteria, it is nevertheless
systematic, time tested, and in some sense corrigible’.
The fact that we do spot similarities between family members, that art
connoisseurs do get to know almost instinctively who painted a newly discov-
ered picture, and so forth shows that there are indeed mechanisms of human
cognition that meet Kuhn’s description of those involved in science. Further-
more, artificial neural networks have been developed that embody learning
with exemplars and have high levels of success in cognitive tasks such as face
and speech recognition, diagnosis in medicine, spam filtering and so forth. So
the question cannot be, ‘is such cognition possible?’ or even ‘would science be
irrational if it were to involve such cognition?’ For such cognition does exist
and it would be bizarre to label high levels of success (e.g. in recognising your
children) are ‘irrational’. Rather, the important question is, does science really
involve such processes?
Let us look then, albeit briefly, at the evidence for a central role for Kuh-
nian pattern recognition in scientific cognition. One piece of evidence is that
already referred to by Kuhn in the quotation above. Exercises in textbooks are
designed to assist students to recognise certain puzzle situations as demanding
solutions using certain equations or other techniques exemplified by worked ex-
amples in the text. The first questions are straightforward, being most similar
to those exemplars. Later questions are increasingly difficult, principally by be-
ing less immediately similar to the exemplars. Working through the questions
will provide the student with a trained sense of when a problem will call for a
certain kind of solution or approach. An experienced student or an expert will
see immediately that a puzzle requires these equations to be deployed in this
way; a neophyte may know those equations but not have any idea about how
they are to be used in solving these puzzles. This plus the fact that skill in this
regard is a matter of degree that is improved by repeated practice suggests that
this is indeed an ability much like pattern recognition and not a matter of de-
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ploying some general problem-solving capacity. Furthermore, experts are able
to see problems as exemplifying deeper physical patterns (e.g. as requiring ap-
plication of a certain principle, such as least action) while neophytes see only
superficial patterns (e.g. classifying puzzles by the kinds of entity involved)
(Chi, Feltovich and Glaser 1981), conforming to Kuhn’s claim that training
with exemplars induces new similarity spaces. Howard Margolis (1987) makes
an extended and persuasive case for the centrality of pattern recognition in all
judgment, including science, supported by historical case studies.
Kuhn’s hypothesis concerning reasoning with paradigms sees scientific cog-
nition as an instance of analogical reasoning. The scientist learns to sees an
analogy between her puzzle and the paradigm puzzle and so see how a solu-
tion to the latter might be transformed to provide a solution to the former.
Analogical reasoning of this sort is indeed ubiquitous in science, as is shown by
close studies of scientists using the approaches of psychology and anthropology
(Holyoak and Thagard 1995, 1997, Dunbar 1996, 1999, Gentner, Holyoak and
Kokinov 2001) as well as historical research on past episodes of scientific change
(Margolis 1987, Gentner and Jeziorski 1993). Such studies not only reveal that
analogical reasoning is central to scientific thinking but also show that there are
different kinds and depths of analogy that are deployed for different purposes.
Of particular interest is the work done on Case-Based Reasoning (CBR).
According to CBR, a case-based reasoner employs a stock of concrete cases;
when a new problem comes along, she compares the new case to the past stock.
Analogies between the new cases and certain of the stock cases will prompt
analogous solutions. Some analogies may be stronger than others, making the
corresponding analogical solutions more plausible than the other possibilities.
CBR has been of primary interest to ‘knowledge engineers’, i.e. those building
artificial intelligence systems to solve certain kinds of problem; the fact that
such models are efficacious in solving scientific and other problems is indirect
evidence for the Kuhnian thesis. Thomas Nickles (2003) is, as far as I am
aware, the first to make the connection between Kuhnian exemplars and CBR.
Nickles does note aspects in which the two diverge. CBR typically includes
negative cases, i.e. cases where an analogy fails, which can often be instruc-
tive, whereas Kuhn’s exemplars are all positive cases. Secondly, Kuhn does not
say enough about the historical development of exemplars. This is an impor-
tant point, for while Kuhn talks of Principia Mathematica as a paradigm, he
also tells us that students learn the paradigm through exemplars in textbooks
and the exercises whereby they learn to apply the exemplars and to see dif-
ferent puzzles as belonging together. But the exemplars of classical mechanics
found in textbooks are not Newton’s exemplars in Principia. The exemplars
have themselves undergone a process of historical development, one, according
to Nickles, whereby we do not just fit new puzzles to old exemplars, but the
exemplars themselves change in response to the new puzzles. Nickles regards
these divergences as exhibiting shortcomings in Kuhn’s account. But the cen-
tral significance of exemplars and the insight that CBR may explain how they
operate remain. Indeed, the naturalistic nature of Kuhn’s claims, made before
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much of the current evidence became available, implies that we should expect
Kuhn’s picture to be modified as further evidence accrues.
The feature of CBR I wish to emphasize is one that is in fact ubiquitous in
our cognitive lives; it is the significance of cognitive habits. While Hume and
others were wrong in thinking that associationism (or classical conditioning)
could explain everything about the way we think, it can nonetheless play a sig-
nificant role in explaining many things. We become adept at playing a piece of
music through exercise, so that certain fingering that needed conscious thought
initially is now performed with unconscious fluency. The same can be true of
intellectual activity also. Indeed Kuhn likens the practice students get (SSR
47) in working through scientific exercises to finger exercises. At first it will
require hard thought and perhaps some trial and error attempts to see how
a particular theory should be applied to a new puzzle. In due course the stu-
dent will find that she has some facility in applying the theory to new puzzles
that may be of the same class as ones she has encountered before. It is only a
difference of degree for the great scientist, as Kuhn tells us:
Scientists model one problem solution on another, often with only a minimal recourse
to symbolic generalizations. Galileo found that ball rolling down an inclined place
acquires just enough velocity to return to the same vertical height on a second incline
of any slope, and he learned to see that experimental situation as like the pendulum
with a point mass for a bob. (Kuhn 1974, 305)
Kuhn goes on to say that Huyghens’s solution to the problem of the centre
of gravity of physical pendulum is modelled on Galileo’s point pendulum, and
then that Bernoulli’s account of water-flow from an orifice in a storage tank
resembles Huyghens’s pendulum.
So the connection between a theory and a puzzle is one that starts out as
obscure and difficult to see but eventually becomes second nature. ‘Second na-
ture’ is so-called because it is, to its possessor, entirely naturally and intuitive,
the reactions are instinctive. On the other hand it is ‘second’—acquired, not
innate. Such connections I have called ‘quasi-intuitive connections’. Such con-
nections cause us to make inferences, e.g. that a certain puzzle-situation can
be seen as a case of simple harmonic motion. It is natural to use perceptual
terms in such cases: as Kuhn says, Galileo sees the ball on the inclined plane
as like the pendulum: on seeing the ball Galileo quasi-intuitively infers that
what is true of the pendulum is true of the ball; that analogy (second) natu-
rally springs to his mind. In many such cases the nature of the subject’s total
experience is the effect, in part, of the learned associations, the quasi-intuitive
inferences the subject makes. Importantly, is this experience that the subject
reports as an observation, as data:
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, particularly chap.10, I repeatedly insist
that members of different scientific communities live in different worlds and that
scientific revolutions change the worlds in which a scientist works. I would now want
to say that members of different communities are presented with different data by
the same stimuli. Notice, however, that that change does not make phrases like “a
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different world” inappropriate. The given world, whether everyday or scientific, is
not a world of stimuli. (Kuhn 1974, 309)
I have elsewhere argued that one way to understand Kuhn’s ‘worlds’ and
‘world-changes’ is in terms of the shared quasi-intuitive connections of a sci-
entific community (Bird 2005). Certain quasi-intuitive connections, because
instilled by training with exemplars, are second nature to all members of the
community. When exemplars change, these patterns of quasi-intuitive connec-
tions change: inferences that were permitted before are not not permitted, and
vice-versa. To take a simplified example, an Aristotelian is permitted to infer
from ‘x is in motion’, to ‘there is a cause of x ’s motion’, whereas the Newtonian
is not permitted to make that inference; for a Newtonian, only the following
is permitted ‘x has changed its motion (i.e. accelerated or decelerated)’ there-
fore ‘there is a cause of x ’s change in motion’. This is the same transition in
quasi-intuitive connections that students have to make when learning physics.
I also propose that such changes in patterns of quasi-intuitive connections
can also account for incommensurability (2007). When one author employs
quasi-intuitive connections that are not possessed by a reader, then it will be
very difficult for the reader to make sense of author’s reasoning. It will appear
to be full of non-sequiturs and so lacking in rationality. Deeper acquaintance
with the author and the author’s exemplars may eventually allow the reader
to understand the tacit connections the author is making and so be able to ra-
tionalise the author’s discussion. I conjecture that something like this explains
Kuhn’s experience on initially finding Aristotle to be an incomprehensibly bad
physicist then converted to appreciating his genius, an experience that was for-
mative in Kuhn’s approach to incommensurability in Structure (1970, v; 1977,
xi–xii; 1987, 8–9). I believe that this way of understanding incommensurability
can also help us appreciate the incommensurability between an old paradigm
and its replacement. Because the quasi-intuitive connections are deeply in-
grained in those practising in the old paradigm, it is difficult for them to grasp
that they are even employing those connections and so difficult also to give
them up. That will be most true for those who have worked most extensively
in the old paradigm, i.e. older scientists and those working centrally, and ex-
plains why younger scientists and those who come from outside the specialty
are able to see possibilities that are in effect ruled out by the quasi-intuitive
connections.
The proposals I sketch above are in need of further empirical confirmation.
Yet, the fact that they rest upon a basis of extensive research in psychology,
cognitive science, and artificial intelligence, as well as history of science, lends
them plausibility. From the perspective of the remainder of this paper, the
important feature to bear in mind is that the central explanatory tool is: a set
of cognitive habits learned by training with exemplars. This contrasts with the
centrality of conceptual structures in the alternative approach to understanding
Kuhn in relation to cognitive science that I turn to now.
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3. Dynamic frames
Some of those who believe that cognitive psychology can assist in illuminat-
ing the problems with which Kuhn was grappling focus on conceptual change.
Nancy Nersessian’s ‘cognitive-historical’ approach is a leading example (Ners-
essian 1987, 1992, 2003). Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen have
developed related ideas in detail to produce a sophisticated account of concep-
tual change that draws upon cognitive science and which vindicates what they
take to be a Kuhnian approach to incommensurability and scientific revolutions
(Andersen, Barker and Chen 1996, 2006; Chen, Andersen and Barker 1998).
While acknowledging the significance of these ideas, and accepting that they
may illuminate aspects of incommensurability, I am sceptical regarding the
central place given to specifically conceptual change. Because the approach of
Andersen, Barker, and Chen (henceforth ABC) is more exclusively conceptual,
it is on their work that I concentrate in this section.
According to ABC (2006, 5), ‘Between 1969 and 1994, Kuhn elaborated
an account of scientific change in which the theory of concepts holds a cen-
tral place.’ Andersen, Barker, and Chen (henceforth ABC) argue that Kuhn’s
account built on ideas from Wittgenstein about concepts, in particular the
family resemblance idea, that he had introduced before this period. They
say that these Wittgensteinian ideas were ‘almost universally repudiated by
philosophers in the English-speaking world’, who preferred the classical defi-
nitional account of concepts. Nonetheless, the approach of Wittgenstein and
Kuhn received empirical confirmation, first in the work of Eleanor Rosch and
her colleagues (Rosch 1973, Rosch and Mervis 1975, Rosch 1988).
The classical theory of concepts says that a concept is a structured entity,
where that structure consists of a set of conditions, individually necessary and
jointly sufficient for the correct application of the concept. While versions of
the classical theory can be traced back to Plato, and a more recent version
to Locke, the classical view was central to logical empiricism. Propositions are
either synthetic or analytic. The truth of the former is verified by empirical
procedures. The truth of the latter is verified by decomposing the constituent
concepts into their components, which are the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for their correct application; a true analytic proposition will be revealed
to be a tautology. Since a large range of non-empirical (but not nonsensical)
propositions, including those of philosophy and mathematics, were held to be
analytic, logical empiricism’s commitment to the classical view of concepts is
significant.
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy challenged the classical view. In particular,
the fact, as he insisted, that some concepts are family resemblance concepts
appeared to refute the idea that the correct application of a concept is de-
termined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. A number of entities
might fall under a family resemblance concept yet share no relevant property
in common; so no (non-trivial) property is individually necessary. What makes
the entities fall under the concept is the fact that those entities are related
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by a network of different resemblances, like the resemblances between various
members of a family.
According to ABC, the classical view, although dominant, came under pres-
sure not only from Wittgenstein’s alternative, later followed by Kuhn, but also
from the fact that successful analyses of concepts into necessary and sufficient
conditions were few: many crucial concepts (such as knowledge) resisted
formidable efforts to analyse them. Most importantly, the classical view, it is
alleged, is refuted by the empirical work of Rosch and others in the 1970s.
This empirical work shows that concept users regard some instances of a
concept as more typical than others, even when the instances all fall under the
concept. For example a sparrow is held to be a more typical instance of bird
than a chicken. According to the classical view both sparrows and chickens
satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for bird; the concept makes
no distinction between them. Such typicality effects usually show a graded
structure, a structure which is revealed in certain kinds of performance, such
as speed in categorising entities. These empirical results led to the development
of an alternative to the classical account of concepts, the prototype view.
The prototype account of concepts is similar to the classical view in that it
regards concepts as structured, consisting of a list of features. However, these
features are not necessary features, features possessed by all instances of a
concept. Rather such features are weighted, reflecting the fact that items in
the concept’s extension tend to have these features. Such weights, which may be
thought of in statistical terms (possibly reflecting frequency in the extension),
will allow there to be a relation of similarity between the representation of
some entity and the concept, a relation that comes in degrees. So bird may
include the feature list (or prototype) has wings, is feathered, lays eggs,
has a beak, small, sings, flies, nests. The weighting of these features
means the following: sparrows are more similar to the prototype than chickens,
because there is some weighting attached to small and sings; both sparrows
and chickens have sufficient similarity to the prototype to be regarded as birds;
while small and sings do contribute to sparrows being classified as birds their
absence from chickens does not disqualify chickens from the category (they are
not necessary conditions).
The prototype account seems to allow for family resemblance concepts:
features can be relevant to classification without being necessary conditions;
similarity is the basis of classification, but not all instances of the concept are
similar in the same way. Rosch herself assimilated Wittgenstein’s view to the
prototype theory she developed. ABC link both to Kuhn’s view of concepts.
Kuhn does refer to Wittgenstein’s family resemblance idea over a page and
a half in Structure.2 ABC draw on this and on Kuhn’s discussion in ‘Second
thoughts on paradigms’ (Kuhn 1974), where Kuhn describes a parent teaching
a child to distinguish ducks, geese, and swans. Initially the child sees the dif-
2 Below I shall argue that Kuhn’s reference to Wittgenstein is incidental, not central to
Structure.
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ferences between individual swans as just as salient as the differences between
swans and geese. The parent then trains the child by pointing out which of the
birds they encounter are ducks, geese, and swans, and also by affirming or cor-
recting the child’s own attempts at classification. Now the child can group the
animals correctly, and thereby gets to know what ‘duck’, ‘goose’, and ‘swan’
mean. ABC point out that Kuhn generalizes this to other scientific concepts. It
is by learning the similarities between different applications of the law sketch
F=ma to concrete problem situations that a student learns the concepts of
force and mass. ‘A conceptual structure,’ they say, ‘is established by grouping
problem situations into similarity classes corresponding to the various expres-
sions of the law sketch’ (Andersen, Barker and Chen 1996, 31).
ABC go beyond the prototype theory to a development from the same set
of ideas, Lawrence Barsalou’s dynamic frame account. The frame account in
effect adds structure to the prototype theory. As with the prototype theory we
identify a concept with various features, which we do as follows. A superordi-
nate concept is associated with several attributes, for example bird with beak,
neck, colour, size, and gait. Each attribute may take one of a number of
values, e.g. beak may take the values round or pointed and foot may take
the values webbed or clawed. A particular subordinate concept is identified
with specific values of these attributes: water bird has the values round for
beak, webbed for foot while land bird has the values pointed for beak
and clawed for foot. An important property of Barsalou’s frames is that
there can be connections between components of the structure. For example,
one might note that there is a correlation between beak shape and foot type:
birds with webbed feet have round bills and birds with claws have pointed
beaks. Such correlations are part of the conceptual structure. ABC (2006, 209)
make it clear that in their view (and in Kuhn’s view) ‘there is no distinction
between defining and contingent features of an object’, so all beliefs about
a kind of object are represented by some aspect of the conceptual structure,
including such such connections (’constraints’).
As indicated with the example of the superordinate concept bird and the
subordinate concepts water bird and land bird, we can use the frame
account to understand taxonomic hierarchies. Such hierarchies are governed
by three principles: the no-overlap principle: distinct concepts do no partially
overlap (either they do not overlap at all or one concept is subordinate to the
other); the exhaustion principle: when a superordinate concept has subordinate
concepts, every entity falling under the superordinate concept falls under some
subordinate concept (nothing is left unclassified by the subordinate concepts);
the inclusion principle: everything falling under a subordinate concept falls
under its superordinate concept.
ABC use the dynamic frame account of concepts to articulate and develop
key Kuhnian ideas: anomaly, revolution, and incommensurability. An anomaly
occurs when an entity (often a thing but may be an event) is discovered whose
classification demands violation of some hierarchical principle. (Because the
structures governed by those principles embody our expectations about what
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there is and what it is like, such entities are unexpected and may be difficult to
recognise as such.) For example, the South American screamer has webbed feet
and a pointed beak. So, on the basis of its beak it seems to require classification
under land bird whereas its webbed feet would propose classification user
water bird. However, to classify the screamer as both land bird and water
bird would be to violate the no-overlap principle.
If such anomalies are to be accommodated (rather than simply excluded),
then the conceptual structure needs to be reformed. As ABC explain, further
attributes of bird, such as plumage and tarsus become relevant so that
there can be three exhaustive but mutually exclusive subordinate concepts
natatores, grallatores, and gallinae, where there were previously only
two (land bird and water bird). Such revisions of the conceptual struc-
ture, where existing entities are redistributed in ways that were forbidden by
the previous taxonomy, are definitive of scientific revolutions, which ABC go on
the illustrate with more sophisticated examples, such as nuclear physics in the
1930s and the development of the Copernican revolution. ABC point out that
this approach allows for revolutions that differ in scale. Revolutionary changes
to taxonomic conceptual structures will involve changes to the similarity and
difference relationships that define our categories. For example, in the bird
case, the basis on which similarity and difference between birds has changed;
in particular new attributes have been added that contribute to determin-
ing the similarity space that were previously irrelevant (e.g. plumage). Such
changes explain incommensurability. ABC argue that incommensurability does
not automatically imply communication failure and use the frame approach to
describe different kinds of conceptual change and their consequences.
4. Discussion
ABC have done an important and useful service in articulating a framework for
understanding Kuhn’s later, taxonomic, account of incommensurability (Kuhn
1987, 1991, 1993. C.f. Sankey 1998). And if Barsalou’s account of concepts is
largely correct for at least some concepts, then they have also provided an in-
sight into how—in some scientific cases—there can be incommensurability and
thereby shed light on the nature of some scientific revolutions, those in which
a revolutionary change is centred on a radical rearrangement of taxonomic
structure. In this section I will argue that we should see ABC’s approach, in-
sightful though it is, as restricted in scope, both as an articulation of Kuhn’s
theory of scientific revolutions, and as an account of the phenomena of scientific
revolutions.
4.1. Understanding the historical context
ABC overstate the case for the dominance of the classical account of concepts
among English-speaking philosophers, and for Kuhn’s being special in reject-
ing it for an account along Wittgensteinian lines. Views of concepts inconsis-
Theoria 75 (2012): 293-321
What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions? 305
tent with the classical account were widely discussed, for example W. B. Gal-
lie’s (1955) idea of an essentially contested concept, Dummett’s (1991) proof-
theoretic semantics, Quine’s meaning nihilism (1951, 1960), Schlick’s (1918)
notion of implicit definition, developing ideas from Hilbert, the holism of the
double-language model of Carnap (1956) and Nagel (1961), and finally the New
Theory of Reference (Marcus 1961, Kripke 1971, 1980), probably the dominant
current view. Many philosophers articulated Wittgenstein-inspired approaches
to concepts, in many case using Waismann’s idea of open-texture, for example
Hart (1961) in philosophy of law, MacIntyre (1973) in social philosophy, Weitz
(1956) and Mandelbaum (1965) in aesthetics, and von Wright (1963) in ethics.
Against such a background, Kuhn’s brief discussion of Wittgenstein does
not stand out. Many philosophers had a rather deeper engagement with
Wittgensteinian ideas, which were widely discussed. And as I shall go on to
argue, the latter were not especially important for Kuhn.
At the same time, other views of meaning and of concepts were developed
that challenged the classical view. So even if ABC were correct that what they
hold to be a Wittgenstein–Kuhn account of concepts is superior to the classical
view, that would not show that the former is our best theory. For there are
alternatives out there; and in particular, I suggest, accounts of concepts need
to be taken seriously that are consistent with the New Theory of Reference—
accounts such as atomism that contradict both the classical account and the
alleged Wittgenstein–Kuhn account.
4.2. Understanding Kuhn’s theory
ABC tell us, ‘We will show that all of the important features of Kuhn’s model
may now be seen as consequences of this fundamental account of human con-
cepts and its dynamics’; ‘We will elaborate the notion of incommensurability,
the central theme of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions’ (ABC 1998, 6).
Because incommensurability was so contentious and because Kuhn spent
so great a proportion of his later work in adjusting and refining his account of
incommensurability, it is easy to gain an exaggerated picture of its significance
in Structure. Kuhn uses the terms ‘incommensurable’ and ‘incommensurabil-
ity’ only nine times in the first edition of Structure, which contrasts with the
hundreds of uses of ‘paradigm’. Incommensurability simply is not ‘the central
theme of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions’ as that theory is articulated
in its locus classicus.
Nor is Kuhn’s use of ideas from Wittgenstein in Structure central to that
theory. Kuhn completed a draft of Structure around April 1961, i.e. only a few
months before completion of the final version as published in 1962 (Hoyningen-
Huene 2006). The principal difference between this draft, now known as Proto-
Structure, and Structure is that the latter has a chapter, ‘The Priority of
Paradigms’, that Proto-Structure lacks. Furthermore, the preceding chapter of
Structure, entitled ‘Normal Science as Puzzle-solving’ exists in Proto-Structure
as a chapter entitled ‘Normal Science as Rule-Determined.’ What we may infer
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from these facts is that the material in ‘The Priority of Paradigms’ is not es-
sential to the basic ideas of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, all of which
is in place in Proto-Structure. The brief passage concerning Wittgenstein is
in this late additional chapter. And so Wittgenstein-inspired ways of thinking
cannot be central to Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, contrary to the
thrust of ABC’s argument.3 We may also infer that Kuhn’s thinking about
rules must have undergone some change after completing Proto-Structure. It
is possible that Kuhn showed Proto-Structure to his colleague Stanley Cavell,
who pointed him in the direction of Wittgenstein as someone who had some-
thing relevant to say about rules, and that Kuhn revised his opinion in response
to reading Wittgenstein. Alternatively, Kuhn independently was rethinking the
nature and significance of rules, and reading Wittgenstein, again probably at
the prompting of Cavell, helped him articulate his new ideas. 4
Either way, what is important is that the newly added reference to Wittgen-
stein does not come at a point where Kuhn is dealing with concepts but in a
chapter where he is concerned with the more general phenomenon of rules and
how they relate to working within a paradigm. ‘Normal Science as Puzzle-
solving’ emphasises the analogy between normal science and puzzle-solving,
and a central part of that argument involves showing that like games (includ-
ing games of puzzle-solving), normal science is played according to rules (as
the title of this chapter’s original in Proto-Structure emphasizes). But in ‘The
Priority of Paradigms’ Kuhn accepts that this cannot be all there is to working
within a paradigm. He points out that a historian seeking the shared rules of
a scientific tradition will meet with partial success but also frustration. That
is because there can be agreement on what the exemplars are without any
explicit, shared articulation of what specific features of those exemplars ex-
plain their continued success. But then there is a puzzle about how there can
be this agreement without there being a full set of rules that the community
are agreed on following. It is in this context that Kuhn includes a footnote to
Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge, for part of the answer is that the agree-
ment is tacit, and not articulated explicitly. Still, that would leave unanswered
the question of how this tacit knowledge and tacit agreement come about.
3 ABC (2006, 105) mention Wittgenstein’s use of the duck-rabbit and say that Kuhn took
over Wittgenstein’s examples. But this seems unlikely, since Kuhn mentions the duck-
rabbit in Proto-Structure and so before he saw the relevance of Wittgenstein’s work.
The duck-rabbit, first used in psychology by Jastrow (1899), has appeared in psychology
textbooks since 1922. It is more probable therefore that Kuhn’s examples came from
his own interest in Gestalt psychology (which Wittgenstein also had), which, as ABC
do note, precedes his acquaintance with the work of Wittgenstein.
4 It should be noted that there is another tradition in Kuhn scholarship that sees a strong
influence by Wittgenstein on Kuhn, for example Kindi (1995a,b), Sharrock and Read
(2002), Narboux (2003). Read (2005) rejects the naturalistic approach that is common
ground to those discussed in this paper; indeed he regards the use of cognitive science
by Nersessian and ABC as un-Wittgensteinian, despite their references to Wittgenstein.
In my view both groups exaggerate the significance of Wittgenstein for Kuhn.
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The passage on Wittgenstein comes next, for it does answer that question.
One might think that the application of concepts is governed by explicit rules,
and while that may be true up to a point, Wittgenstein’s argument surround-
ing family resemblance concepts shows that this cannot be the whole story.
As Kuhn (1970, 45) says, ‘For Wittgenstein, in short, games, and chairs, and
leaves are natural families, each constituted by a network of overlapping and
crisscross resemblances.’ It is the importance of learning to spot resemblances
that Kuhn identifies here and which replaces the explicit following of rules.
This he exploits in the next paragraph when he returns to science:
Something of the same sort may very well hold for the various research problems and
techniques that arise within a single normal-scientific tradition. What these have in
common is not that they satisfy some explicit or even some fully discoverable set of
rules and assumptions that gives the tradition its character and its hold upon the
scientific mind. Instead, they may relate by resemblance and by modeling to one
or another part of the scientific corpus which the community in question already
recognizes as among its established achievements.
As this context shows Kuhn is not interested here in articulating a theory
of concepts. Rather he is articulating a theory of how learning to recognise
resemblances can replace the explicit following of rules. Wittgenstein’s point of
about concepts is an analogue to Kuhn’s point about working with exemplars,
albeit one underpinned by the same cognitive ability in recognising patterns of
resemblances.
The conclusion of the preceding paragraphs is this. The reference to
Wittgenstein in Structure is not central to this theory of scientific
revolutions; it is a late addition to that theory. And Kuhn’s purpose in
talking about Wittgenstein is not to articulate a theory of concepts; it is to
show how recognition of resemblances can replace explicit following of rules;
and the purpose of that is to give a more satisfactory account of what is
involved in working in a paradigm. Furthermore, the reference to
Wittgenstein comes nowhere near Kuhn’s discussion of incommensurability,
which does not make an appearance for another hundred pages.
Consequently, we should not think that because Kuhn refers to Wittgenstein
in Structure that he is there beginning to develop a Wittgenstein-inspired
theory of concepts that is central to his theory of scientific revolutions.
Because it concerns Structure, published in 1962, what I have said so far
in this section is consistent ABC’s key claim that the theory of concepts is
central to Kuhn’s account of scientific change elaborated between 1969 and
1994. If they are right, then Kuhn developed a second account of scientific
change, substantially different from the theory in Structure. Kuhn does write
‘Violation or distortion of a previously unproblematic scientific language is the
touchstone for revolutionary change’ (1987, 21) in his paper ‘What are scientific
revolutions?’, written in 1981. And he does indeed develop a novel account of
incommensurability, one based on taxonomic violation, elements of which are
found in ‘What are scientific revolutions?’ Nonetheless, the textual evidence
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for a new theory of scientific change is thin. ‘What are scientific revolutions?’
is mostly taken up with descriptions of three episodes of revolutionary change,
followed by only three pages of discussion. The latter picks out three common
features: (i) the changes are locally holistic: several scientific commitments
(theoretical claims, etc.) are changed together, where it would make no sense to
make the changes piecemeal; (ii) there are changes to the taxonomic categories
involved; and (iii) ‘a central change of model, metaphor, or analogy’, which
Kuhn thinks is ‘probably the most consequential’ of the characteristics (1987,
20). While the centrality of of taxonomic change is certainly new, Kuhn says too
little, here or elsewhere, to attribute to him a new account of scientific change.
At most what we get is a change in what he takes to constitute a scientific
revolution. But that leaves untouched the dynamics of scientific revolutions
(why they occur, what happens when they occur, and how they are resolved).
Another question for ABC’s thesis concerns the timing of the claimed shift
in Kuhn’s thinking about scientific change. They date is back to 1969, when
Kuhn wrote the Postscipt to the second edition of Structure. While this does
show important new ideas and emphases, Kuhn is clearly most concerned to
clarify and elaborate the central ideas of Structure, those concerning paradigms,
exemplars in particular. Crucially, the period they refer to includes Kuhn’s
‘Second thoughts on paradigms’ (1974), which is central to their case that
Kuhn held a Wittgenstein-inspired account of concepts—yet Kuhn does not
mention Wittgenstein at all in ‘Second thoughts’.
Pace ABC, in ‘Second thoughts on paradigms’ Kuhn does not expound a
theory of concepts (he doesn’t use the term ‘concept’ and only sparsely talks
about ‘meaning’). Rather, he is principally concerned to further articulate his
notion of exemplar as paradigm (as the title hints) and to argue that exem-
plars can function without rules. In particular we do not apply exemplars and
their symbolic generalisations to the world by obeying correspondence rules
(as the logical positivists would have); rather we do so in virtue of having
learned similarities between the exemplary puzzle situation and the puzzles
we are confronted with (as discussed in section 2.). If the correspondence rule
approach were right, then such a rule might say something like, ‘apply Ohm’s
law to situations with features F in such-and-such a way’, implying that we
would have some prior grasp on what F is. In denying the work supposedly
done by correspondence rules, Kuhn denies that we are able to group puzzle-
situations by their being F. So how do we know when to apply Ohm’s law?
Kuhn (1974, 308) therefore says, ‘I now want to argue, there is a means of
processing data into similarity sets which does not depend on a prior answer
to the question, similar with respect to what?’ But he does not want to deploy
scientific examples because ‘inevitably the latter prove excessively complex’
(1974, 309).5 That is why he uses the story of Johnny learning to differentiate
5 ABC state that this refers to the learning of concepts. But it is clear from the context pro-
vided by the preceding three paragraphs that Kuhn (1974, 308) is primarily concerned
with ‘learning to see two problems as similar’ (my emphasis).
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ducks, swans, and geese, because that is a process whereby someone learns to
group entities (in story: wildfowl; in science: scientific problems) into classes
of similar entities (in story: e.g. ducks; in science: e.g. problems requiring ap-
plication of Ohm’s law).6 So although Kuhn’s discussion in ‘Second thoughts
on paradigms’ provides fuel for a theory of concepts, developing such a theory
is not Kuhn’s focus, which he himself tells us is the wider question of the op-
eration of paradigms (understood as exemplars) and their dependence on the
process of learning to apprehend similarities by training (rather than rules).
ABC’s primary source for what they call ‘Kuhn’s theory of concepts’ is not
intended to be any such thing (just as Kuhn’s reference to Wittgenstein is not
intended to articulate a view about meaning).7
In summary, Kuhn was not concerned to develop a theory of concepts in
Structure; his mention of Wittgenstein there is not central to his argument
and is not concerned with promoting a Wittgensteinian view of meaning. And
since the theory of concepts does not play a central role in his exposition of
the theory of scientific revolutions in Structure it is implausible, in my view,
that more advanced theories of concepts provided by cognitive science will il-
luminate or add to what Kuhn intended in that theory. So ABC’s argument
depends on there being a later theory of scientific change, that does have a
theory of concepts at its core. Yet the evidence that Kuhn developed such a
theory is thin. There is no new theory in the Postcript 1969 to the second
edition of Structure, nor is there in ‘Second thoughts on paradigms’ (1974).
ABC interpret the latter as proposing a view of concepts, but closer examina-
tion does not support that view. It is true that Kuhn does later develop his
ideas concerning incommensurability, and in particular the taxonomic account
(1987, 1991, 1993). I fully agree that ABC’s approach is a very productive
way of developing Kuhn’s thoughts in this respect (although I think there are
limitations both to the dynamic frame account of concepts and to the taxo-
nomic account of incommensurability). Does the development of that account
amount also to a new, revised theory of scientific change? I have argued that
the evidence is thin. In any case, as I shall go on to argue, insofar as Kuhn did
reconceive revolutions as a certain kind of taxonomic change, the result is an
unsatisfactory account of scientific change.
6 Note reference above to Chi, Feltovich and Glaser (1981) and their work in showing how
expertise causes changes in which scientific problems are held to be similar.
7 It is also worth noting that Johnny’s learning to differentiate waterfowl by creating a
mental space of similarities and dissimilarities does not mean that Johnny’s concepts
duck, swan and goose are family resemblance concepts, since nothing in the story
suggests that the concepts are constituted by criss-crossing resemblances such that no
single resemblance is shared by all of one kind. Not all resemblance is family resemblance.
The conjecture that Kuhn recognised that fact would explain why he did not refer to
Wittgenstein in his discussion. If, as ABC claim, this discussion is a development of his
theory of concepts based on the earlier adoption of Wittgenstein’s family-resemblance
in Structure, then that omission is surprising.
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4.3. Understanding scientific revolutions
Irrespective of whether we can develop Kuhn’s theory within a framework taken
from Rosch and Barsalou, is it in fact the case that their theories can tell us
something about the phenomena of scientific revolution and incommensurabil-
ity? Here I argue that there are potentially significant limitations to the scope
of the application of those theories. First, we must recognise that there are
important objections to those theories that mean that at best they offer only
a partial account of concepts. (I shall concentrate on the prototype account,
since this is the core of the approach that ABC adopt.)
The empirical results of the work of Eleanor Rosch are widely (but not uni-
versally) agreed to be inconsistent with the classical theory, and so are taken
by ABC to support what they regard as the Wittgenstein–Kuhn approach and
subsequent developments by Barsalou and others. In the light of the preceding
paragraphs we should be wary in inferring from the falsity of the classical the-
ory to the correctness of the ‘Wittgenstein–Kuhn approach’—there are other
competitors to be considered. Indeed Laurence and Margolis (1999) list five
competing types of theories of concepts: the classical theory, the prototype
theory, the neo-classical theory, the theory theory, and atomism. All have their
problems and all have things to be said in their favour.
It is worth being aware of some of the limitations of the prototype theory:
• The problem of compositionality. Compound concepts are composed of
their component concepts. But the prototype of pet fish is a small, gold
animal that lives in a bowl or tank. This cannot be composed from the
prototypes for pet (furry, mammalian) and fish (brown, medium sized,
lives in the sea).
• Conceptual ignorance. A subject may have distinct concepts ruthenium
and rhodium yet be sufficiently ignorant that he has no knowledge that
distinguishes ruthenium from rhodium. His prototypes for the two con-
cepts are identical. So the concepts ought to be identical too, according
to the prototype theory.
• The problem of irrelevant detail. Prototypes may include features that are
not part of the concept. Fernando Torres is the prototype of a footballer.
But fernando torres is not part of the concept footballer. If it
were, then the concept footballer would change as older footballers
retire and younger footballers become famous.
• Psychological essentialism. Experimental evidence suggests that we use
some concepts as if we are essentialists, thinking that the correct appli-
cation of some concept is governed by some factor of which we may be
unaware.
A natural conclusion to draw from these objections is that prototypicality
structures are not constitutive of concepts. The very same evidence supports
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equally that claim that prototypicality structures are associated with concepts
but not constitutive of them, and that concepts get their identity via some
other mechanism. For example ruthenium and rhodium get their identi-
ties by being hooked up to the world in different ways. If I learn more about
ruthenium, so that I now have a richer prototypicality structure, that is not
a matter of acquiring a new concept but of associating new facts/beliefs to
my pre-existing concept. The prototype theorist looks forced to accept some-
thing like this for pet fish; the same is no less true of pet and fish also.
The graded structure revealed by experiments may best be understood not as
revealing the facts about our concept but rather facts about the epistemology
of applying those concepts. For example, we may use prototypes in the appli-
cation of concepts, but those prototypes are just heuristic devices to enable
faster processing.
It is a largely empirical matter whether the prototype theory can overcome
such objections, and whether they also present insurmountable problems for
the dynamic frames account. Even if we accept the broad approach defined
by those theories, do such theories in fact help us understand what goes on
in scientific revolutions? Is it the case, as ABC (1998, 18) declare, that ‘revi-
sions in taxonomy . . . are now the distinguishing feature of revolutions’. Are
anomalies cases that cause tension in an existing conceptual structure since
they violate hierarchical principles or demand divergent categorizations (1998,
7; 2006, 69–72)? I suggest that these claims are mistaken. Scientific revolu-
tions are frequently accompanied by conceptual changes, and in some cases
conceptual change may be central to the nature of the revolution. But in some
cases there is no significant conceptual change, and even in the cases where
there is conceptual change, that change is typically not all that there is to the
scientific revolution. The principal reason for these claims is simple. Core to
most science is belief. And in many cases to understand fully what happens
in a revolution requires appreciation how beliefs changed. And not all belief
change, even significant belief change, is conceptual change.
It is simple to find anomalies in the history of science that do not satisfy
ABC’s description of them as violations of hierarchical principles, and which
do not create pressure for categorisation of things or phenomena in diverse
ways. Here are some examples:
• Anomalous planetary orbits. While Newton had been able to show that
principal ‘inequalities’ in the motion of the Moon were due to the gravita-
tional attraction of the Sun, nonetheless Newton’s successors were unable
to eliminate a significant discrepancy between the predictions of the the-
ory and what was observed. In the 1740s the discrepancy was held by
some to be an anomaly requiring possible adjustment to Newton’s inverse
square law (with further terms). The anomaly violates no principle of cat-
egorisation; it is a simple mismatch between what the theory demanded
and what was observed. As it was, Clairaut was ultimately able to re-
solve the anomaly by correcting certain empirical approximations. But
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had the inverse square law required changing, that would not have been
a change in taxonomy. Much the same can be said about the anomalous
precession of the perihelion of Mercury. While the revolutionary general
theory of relativity did involve conceptual revision, the anomaly in the
orbit of Mercury did not itself imply any tension on categorisation or
pose any threat to hierarchical principles.
• Anomalies in classical physics. (i) The ultraviolet (Rayleigh–Jeans) catas-
trophe. Classical physics predicts that a black-body in equilibrium will
emit an infinite quantity of energy in any finite time. Clearly it does not.
(ii) Models of the atom. The results of the Geiger–Marsden experiment
were anomalous in the light of the then current ‘plum-pudding’ model
of the atom (Thomson). Rutherford, following a suggestion of Nagaoka,
proposed a concentration of positive charge in what we call the nucleus,
with electrons forming a cloud. While resolving the preceding anomaly,
because the nucleus is able to repel the alpha particle, this model cre-
ated its own anomaly. For the electrons to remain at a distance from the
nucleus they must be moving (like planets around the sun), but their
motion would lead to loss of energy as electromagnetic radiation, leading
them to spiral into the nucleus. Yet atoms are clearly stable. Both the
latter anomaly and the ultraviolet catastrophe were resolved by the de-
velopment of the quantum theory, which indeed involved important con-
ceptual change. But as above, the anomalies themselves do not breach
hierarchical principles or suggest divergent categorisations.
• Anomalies in Galen. Galen’s human anatomy, much of which had been
based on dissections of apes, came under critical scrutiny in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. Vesalius showed that many of Galen’s asser-
tions are not born out by observations of the human body. For example,
Galen claimed that there is a porous interventricular septum, so that
blood could pass from the right ventricle of the heart to the left (as his
model required). Vesalius’s dissections published in the second edition
of De Humani Corporis Fabrica showed this to be false. This was not
only a mistake in Galen’s work, but was anomalous for his theory of the
movement of the blood. Perhaps the best known anomaly for that theory
is that expounded by Harvey, who in chapter eight of De Motu Cordis
estimated that quantity of blood pumped by the heart (about 250kg in a
day). Galen’s theory held that (venous) blood was produced by the liver
and absorbed elsewhere in the body. But clearly it would be impossible
for the liver to produce this quantity of new blood. The anomalies are
significant for Galen’s theory. But they are once again straightforward
to understand: the dominant theory held or implied p; observation show
that p is false.
Such cases show that anomalies are not always cases that violate hierarchical
principles; often they are simple (though significant) disagreements between
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theory and observation—in the physical sciences such disagreements may be
simply quantitative and so no question of taxonomy need be raised.
Even if I am right about anomalies, it might nonetheless be the case that
any resulting revolution is a significant change in taxonomy. Many examples,
however, show that there are revolutions that do not result in significant tax-
onomic change. One significant problem with the ABC view is presented by
science of which taxonomy is not a significant element.
• Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity undoubtedly made
revolutionary contributions to physics, yet the physics in question is not
concerned with taxonomy. No doubt one can construct taxonomies that
would be affected by these changes. So the relativity of simultaneity dis-
rupts a taxonomy of events that is available under classical assumptions
(e.g. ‘past’, ‘present’, ‘future’). But such taxonomies are not central to
the Einsteinian revolutions and to attempt to characterize the revolu-
tions in terms of taxonomic change would be to miss the key innovations
of Einstein’s theories.
Kuhn (1970, 101–2) does argue that there is conceptual change in general rel-
ativity (concerning the terms ‘space’, ‘time’, and ‘mass’). But these are not
taxonomic terms. ABC’s claim that revolutionary change is taxonomic change
is the consequence of two assertions, that revolutionary change is conceptual
change and that conceptual change is taxonomic change, which imposes a dou-
ble straight-jacket on revolutions.
Even sciences with taxonomies can undergo revolutions that do not involve
significant conceptual change and without disrupting taxonomic structures.
Here are some examples:
• The discovery of the structure of DNA. One of the most far-reaching
scientific discoveries of all time, Crick and Watson’s elucidation of the
structure of DNA must count as revolutionary in that it transformed
biology and biochemistry and gave rise to several new scientific fields
(such as molecular genetics). In so doing the discovery led to the addition
of new taxonomic categories and indeed new taxonomies structures. Yet it
did not require any radical changes to existing structures. The taxonomic
effects are cumulative rather than revisionary.
• The cause of stomach ulcers. The standard view was that the principal
cause of gastric ulcers is excess stomach acid, which could be brought
about by factors such as stress. Barry Marshall and Robin Warren showed
that 90% of such ulcers are caused by the bacterium H. pylori. This was
a revolutionary change. It overturned a theory that had held sway for
decades and which underpinned a raft of clinical procedures and commer-
cial activities, including psychoanalytic therapies, surgery, and a multi-
billion dollar pharmaceutical industry. It was fiercely resisted for some
time, but is now the accepted view, with corresponding changes in scien-
tific and clinical practice. In this case there is a change in classification.
Theoria 75 (2012): 293-321
314 Alexander BIRD
We might have a classification of diseases by primary cause, and peptic
ulcers (gastric and duodenal ulcers) have moved from ‘stress-induced’ to
‘bacterial infection’. That change is not a change in taxonomic structure,
just a change in where one places an item in an unchanged structure.
Hence ABC’s theory cannot account for it as a revolutionary change.
• The function of the heart. Harvey’s response to the anomalies in Galen’s
account of the heart and blood was to provide a new theory of their func-
tion and motion: blood circulates, pumped by he heart. This is a radical
departure from Galen’s teaching and is righty regarded as one of the
most important revolutionary discoveries in physiology, notwithstanding
the fact that there are many continuities between Harvey’s thinking and
the preceding era. Harvey’s work had a profound influence on subsequent
physiology. For example, given that Harvey had shown that the liver does
not create blood, then it is natural to ask what then is the function of
the liver, thereby stimulating novel (and also revolutionary) work by
Batholin and others on the liver and lymphatic system. Furthermore,
Harvey’s work was pioneering in terms of technique, as an exemplar of
experimental physiology. It is difficult to see how this revolution can be
characterised as a change in taxonomic structure.
• The discovery of nuclear structure. The two decades from 1909 saw a
radical transformation in our understanding of the structure of the atom
and in particular of the nucleus, with much of the work directed or in-
spired by Ernest Rutherford. As discussed above, the Geiger–Marsden
experiment led to the development of the Rutherford–Bohr model of the
atom, with positive charge concentrated in a ‘nucleus’. Bohr’s version of
model end experimental work by Moseley implied a relationship between
atomic number and nuclear charge, which in turn suggested that there
are discrete entities each with unit positive charge, experimentally con-
firmed by Rutherford’s ‘splitting the atom’ experiment. Yet this raised
the question, how could discrete like charges be held together against
their mutually repulsive forces, which led to the hypothesis of further,
uncharged nuclear particles and the discovery of the neutron by Chad-
wick in 1932. This sequence of discoveries led to the science of nuclear
physics, some important aspects of which are described in detail by ABC.
Like the discovery of the structure of DNA, a principal contribution of
this revolution is that is opens up a while new field of science, providing
a paradigm of how that science is to be carried out. As as in the case of
Harvey, the revolution involved and promoted the development of new
experimental techniques, for example the use of high-energy particles to
probe the structure of matter that became exemplars of experimental
methods that have developed to the present day.
In most of these cases the revolutions are best understood as changes in
what is believed, whose significance is generated by the theoretical and exper-
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imental context in which they occur. In addition others involve revolutionary
changes in experimental technique. Kuhn explains, for example, how the dis-
covery of X-rays was revolutionary because it potentially called into question
the use of cathode ray tubes and the results produced by them, while also
opening up a new field. The development of staining techniques in cytology
and statistical tests in social research are further examples. Many cases in the
history of science will exhibit theoretical and experimental change. In both
kinds of case, new paradigms are generated: new exemplars of scientific think-
ing and doing. In these cases, I have argued, changes in conceptual structure
are not significant in understanding what is going on. Some cases involved
additions to conceptual structure, but for ABC such additions are not revolu-
tionary changes, for the latter require disruption to conceptual structure. In
other cases there may be some such disruption: arguably the concept of chem-
ical element went through a disruptive change as a result of the changes
in understanding of atomic structure. Maybe with a little ingenuity one could
make a case for some kind of conceptual change in all these cases. But any
such changes would be tangential to the cognitive changes that science and
scientists underwent. Since ABC make a general claim about the nature of
scientific revolutions (as being a matter of taxonomic change), such cases serve
to refute their thesis. Refuting their general thesis does not require asserting
that the sort of conceptual change they describe is never central to a scientific
revolution. Sometimes it may well be, and the cases they describe are excel-
lent candidates. The conclusion we should draw from their cases is not that
all revolutions involve such change but only that some revolutions involve
such changes. We may add to the kinds of revolutionary changes in science
mentioned in the first two sentences of this paragraph: depending on the scien-
tific context (theoretical, technical, conceptual), a scientific revolution might
be a significant change to what is believed, to experimental technique, or to
conceptual structure. In each case the revolution will create new exemplars.
I shall now turn to incommensurability, albeit briefly, for my conclusions
concerning incommensurability are corollaries of what has been said above.
ABC (1998, 6) tell us that ‘the notion of incommensurability [is] the central
theme of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions’. Incommensurability does not
play a major role in Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions as found in Struc-
ture (furthermore, the incommensurability there is methodological as well as
conceptual). Kuhn does give incommensurability a central role in his later
work. But since he did not undertake a concerted revision of his theory of
scientific revolutions, it cannot be said that incommensurability becomes the
central theme of that theory, whose principal source remains Structure. Sec-
ondly, the examples given above of revolutionary changes in science without
taxonomic shifts are a fortiori examples of revolutionary change without tax-
onomic incommensurability. We noted that Kuhn himself argues that there is
conceptual change and incommensurability in the Einsteinian case. If Kuhn is
correct about that, then it isn’t taxonomic incommensurability. Yet, for ABC,
incommensurability is taxonomic incommensurability.
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If we start not from a theory of incommensurability, but from the phe-
nomenon of incommensurability, matters look different. In Structure, we iden-
tify incommensurability by its symptoms, such as a sense that the world has
changed, something like a Gestalt switch, when what seemed incoherent now
makes sense. We can see how such phenomena did occur in some of these
cases. For example, Barry Marshall’s wife reports overhearing comments at a
gastroenterology conference in the United States, ‘They were talking about
this terrible person that they imported from Australia to speak. You know:
“How could they put such rubbish in the conference?” ’ (Schulz 2010). Despite
the fact that bacterial infections are so common and the fact that no-one had
any direct evidence against Marshall’s theory, it was branded as rubbish. In
part because physicians believed that stomachs were too acidic for bacteria
(though bacteriologists knew better) and in large part because a totally dif-
ferent theory (the stress theory) had held sway for so long and had informed
every aspect of their thinking and practice, it was difficult for them to see that
such a radical alternative could be scientifically respectable. This, I suggest,
is an important phenomenon in understanding scientific change, but it is one
not one captured by thinking in terms of conceptual change. It is nonetheless,
I suggest, one that can be readily understood in terms of cognitive habits.
5. Conclusion
ABC make bold claims about their approach to scientific revolutions and in-
commensurability. They elaborate Barsalou’s dynamic frame account of con-
cepts and assert ‘We will show that all of the important features of Kuhn’s
model [of scientific revolutions] may now be seen as consequences of this fun-
damental account of human concepts and its dynamics’ (1998, 6). I think this
is badly mistaken. For a start, we should be alive to problems with ABC’s
preferred approach to concepts and the fact that it has competitors. Be that
as it may, does such a theory provide us with a way of capturing Kuhn’s theory
of scientific change? No, because conceptual change is not central to his the-
ory as articulated in Structure; incommensurability is not a central theme of
Structure. The references to Wittgenstein are late additions and incidental to
his theory. And they are not intended to articulate a theory of concepts; they
are intended to be an example of learning similarity relations without learning
explicit rules. The focus of Structure is paradigms, both regarded as shared
commitments of scientific community and as a particular set of commitments,
the shared exemplars. The latter constitute Kuhn’s most significant innovation,
and are, I suggest, best understood with the tools of cognitive psychology, in
particular with the aid of research on pattern recognition, analogical thinking,
and case-based reasoning. What I say about Structure may be consistent with
what ABC say about Kuhn, if Kuhn developed a later theory of scientific rev-
olutions, one radically different from that in Structure. But they present no
compelling evidence that he did.
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Kuhn did develop a later theory of taxonomic incommensurability, and
ABC’s scholarship is very helpful in showing how the frame theory of con-
cepts may illuminate and develop that theory. Since incommensurability is not
central to Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions, this fact does not license
the bold claim the ‘all of the important features of Kuhn’s model’ are conse-
quences of the frame account of concepts. Rather, what ABC have done is show
how the frame account and taxonomic incommensurability may be central ele-
ments of some scientific revolutions and parts (but not the only parts) of other
scientific revolutions; we must note that they may also be absent from some
scientific revolutions. That important restriction on what the frame account
can do matches the fact that we can find anomalies and scientific revolutions
that simply do not fit their model.
To the historical examples adduced to support the last claim, at least as
regard revolutions, two responses are conceivable. The first will say that my
examples of revolutions are not true Kuhnian revolutions. For example, the
revolutions ensuing from the discoveries of the structure of DNA and of the
structure of the atomic nucleus are not revolutions because they are not revi-
sionary. Or the discovery of the cause of stomach ulcers is not revolutionary
because it is small scale. Such responses would not be true to Kuhn’s aims.
Kuhn is explicit that although the most important characteristics of scientific
revolutions emerge from study of grand revolutions (such as the Newtonian or
chemical revolutions), ‘It is . . . a fundamental thesis of this essay [structure]
that they can also be retrieved from the study of many other episodes that
were not so obviously revolutionary’ (Kuhn 1970, 6). Non-revisionary changes
often do involve competition between often radically different theories and the
development of new paradigms and exemplars, and they can show incommen-
surability. And Kuhn himself came to regard the development of new specialties
as important, seeing the process as analogous to speciation.
In any case, I see no reason why important revisionary changes should
necessarily be accompanied by taxonomic changes. Not all science involves
taxonomy. Not all changes in belief imply a change of taxonomy, even where
the latter is present. An important change in the transition from Aristotelian to
Newtonian physics is the move from thinking that all motion requires explana-
tion to thinking that it is only non-uniform motion that needs explaining; that
does not look as if it can be neatly explained as a taxonomic change. Further-
more, scientific revolutions can centre on changes in practice and technique,
and these are even further removed from taxonomic change. ABC (2006, 33)
do note, it should be acknowledged, that it is a possible shortcoming of their
account that it provides only limited insight into ‘nomic’ concepts. Normic
concepts are those acquired though learning similarity (and difference) rela-
tions by ostension; these are the concepts to which their theory applies. Nomic
concepts are acquired via the complex problem situations in which the concept
and the law in which it figures are applied. ABC say that Kuhn did not give an
account of how to identify the referents of individual nomic concepts in such
cases. This restriction on the application of their theory is potentially very
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significant. For it could be argued that very few scientific concepts are normic
by this characterisation, since not many scientific concepts are introduced by
ostension (the concepts discussed in their example of nuclear physics would be
excluded by this criterion). ABC say it would be hubristic to claim a complete
account of all scientific concepts; if so, then they are not in a position to claim
to give a general account of scientific change. As it is, I think that accepting
limitations on the reach of their theory is the correct response.
The second kind of response aims to maintain much of the universality
of ABC’s claim by being liberal with what counts as taxonomic change. In
particular, they might argue that I have not appreciated the significance of the
‘constraints’ that operate between taxonomic categories. Beliefs act as such
constraints and so revisions to such beliefs do lead to taxonomic change. The
danger with this approach is that is makes the theory less informative while
also diverting the focus. Too much counts as conceptual change (any belief
change has that effect). More importantly, let us imagine that we can come
up with Aristotelian and Newtonian frames such that the explanatory shift
mentioned above can be represented as a conceptual change. How would that
help us understand what is important about that shift? Would that explain, for
example, why Galileo’s physics (proto-Newtonian in this regard) was difficult
for many Aristotelians to understand fully?
It strikes me that the undue emphasis on conceptual change is a hangover,
albeit in an up-to-date and scientifically well-informed guise, of the linguis-
tic approach to philosophy. For several decades many analytic philosophers
thought that philosophical problems were always linguistic in character. Now
this is not a widespread view, especially as naturalism has become more com-
mon in philosophy. Appealing to a sophisticated account of concepts from
cognitive science is a way of working within the naturalistic paradigm while
hanging onto the older conviction that language is all. But it is not every-
thing, not even in cognitive science. So while we should welcome the insights
offered by ABC we should not regard those insights as explaining everything
that Kuhn wanted to explain; to do so is to adopt the same procrustean ap-
proach offered by the old linguistic philosophy. Rather those insights should
be deployed alongside other discoveries and theories in cognitive science that
are not conceptual in focus, for example the work on analogy, case based rea-
soning, cognitive habits, and quasi-intuitive connections that I sketched above
in section 2.. With a broader set of explanatory tools, I believe that we can
come closer to showing how cognitive science can vindicate many of Kuhn’s
most interesting claims in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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